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On January 1, 1999, the Euro was launched and the Eurosystem (the ECB and 11 na-
tional central banks in Europe) took responsibility for monetary policy in the Euro area.
This paper is a brief evaluation of the Eurosystem￿s monetary-policy regime after its ￿rst
year, in particular of the extent to which it is similar to in￿ation targeting as practiced
by an increasing number of central banks.1 I examine three elements of the Eurosystem,
namely the goals,t h eframework for monetary-policy decisions and the communication
with outsiders. Criteria for evaluation are whether the goals are unambiguous and appro-
priate; whether the decision framework is e¢cient in collecting and processing information
and reaching decisions that are appropriate relative to the goals; and whether the commu-
nication is e⁄ective in motivating decisions, simplifying external evaluation and thereby
improving transparency and accountability. I also consider whether the actual instrument
setting has been appropriate, given the information available at the times of decision.
During the 1990s an increasing number of central banks have adopted in￿ation tar-
geting, which due to its logical and transparent design and apparent success so far has
become a focus of interest and a natural frame of reference. In￿ation targeting is char-
acterized by, ￿rst, an explicit numerical in￿ation target. The in￿ation target is pursued
in the medium run, with due concern for avoiding real instability, for instance, in the
output-gap; that is, in￿ation targeting is ￿￿exible￿ rather than ￿strict.￿ Second, due to
the unavoidable lags in the e⁄ects of instruments on in￿ation, the decision framework is in
practice ￿in￿ation-forecast targeting￿ (see below). Third, communication is very explicit
and to the point; policy decisions are consistently motivated with reference to published
in￿ation and output(-gap) forecasts. Indeed, in￿ation targeting has introduced unprece-
dented transparency and accountability in monetary policy. Three central banks￿theReserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England, and Sweden￿s Sveriges Riksbank￿
stand out as particularly consistent and transparent in their implementation of in￿ation
targeting.
I. Goals
The Maastricht Treaty assigns price stability as the primary objective for the Eu-
rosystem but leaves to the Eurosystem the formulation of an operational de￿nition. In
October 1998 the Eurosystem de￿ned price stability as ￿as a year-on-year increase in the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area of below 2%￿ (ECB 1998a). It has
several times emphasized the medium-term orientation of its policy and that a gradualist
and measured response to threats to price stability will not introduce ￿unnecessary and
possibly self-sustaining uncertainty into short-term interest rates or the real economy...￿
(ECB 1999). This emphasis on the medium term, gradualism, and stability of the real
economy is consistent with ￿￿exible￿ rather than ￿strict￿ in￿ation targeting.
However, as commentators quickly pointed out, the Eurosystem￿s de￿nition of price
stability was ambiguous, since it did not specify a lower bound for in￿ation. In November
1998 the ECB president, Willem Duisenberg (1998a), clari￿ed that the word ￿increase￿
should be interpreted as excluding de￿ation. It would seem to follow that the lower bound
was zero and that the de￿nition refers to an in￿ation rate between 0 and 2%. However,
two days later, Duisenberg (1998b) stated that ￿[w]e did not announce a ￿oor for in￿ation,
because we know that the price index may include a measurement bias, but we do not
know its magnitude￿.
If the lower bound is zero, it would seem logical to use the midpoint, 1%, as the point
in￿ation target in the calculation of the M3 reference value. However, when the reference
value was announced in December 1998 (ECB 1998b), it appeared that a point in￿ation
target of 1.5% had been used instead.
To this date (January 2000), so far as I know, the Eurosystem has not yet been
explicit about the lower bound. If this omission were due to uncertainty about possible
measurement bias, it would seem that this would a⁄ect both the lower and upper bound to
the same extent; otherwise, the width of the range becomes dependent on the measurement
2bias. It is di¢cult to see any bene￿t from such ambiguity. An unambiguous symmetric
de￿nition (for instance, ￿above 0 and below 2%￿) would seem preferable, especially since
de￿ation may be as serious a threat these days as in￿ation.2
II. Decision Framework
Although in￿ation targeting is technically di¢cult in practice, the principles of in￿a-
tion targeting are relatively straightforward. Given that monetary policy actions a⁄ect in-
￿ation with a lag, e¢cient in￿ation targeting requires in￿ation-forecast targeting (see, for
instance, Lars Svensson (1997) and (1999a) and Svensson and Michael Woodford (1999)).
That is, the central bank needs to make conditional in￿ation forecasts (conditional on
its view of the transmission mechanism, the current state of the economy, and a given
planned path for its instrument rate). The bank then selects the instrument plan that
results in an ￿optimal￿ in￿ation forecast, that is, an in￿ation forecast that approaches the
in￿ation target at an appropriate pace without causing too much variability in the real
economy or interest rates. The bank then starts implementing the instrument plan, by
setting the interest rate accordingly. At regular intervals, if new signi￿cant information
has been collected, the procedure is repeated and a new interest rate plan adopted and
implemented. From this perspective, in￿ation-forecast targeting is just an algorithm to
solve an intertemporal optimization problem. With minor di⁄erences, this is the decision
framework used by all in￿ation-targeting central banks.3 Thus, if the Eurosystem wants to
meet its de￿nition of price stability in the medium term, it must decide on an instrument
plan such that the corresponding in￿ation forecast in the medium term, conditional on all
relevant information and its instrument plan, falls between the undisclosed lower bound
and the upper bound of 2%.
In October 1998, the Eurosystem (ECB 1998a, see also ECB 1999) announced that
the monetary policy strategy would consist of ￿two key elements,￿ later called ￿the two
pillars:￿ The ￿rst pillar is ￿a prominent role for money￿ with a reference value for M3
growth, set at 4.5% in December 1998 (ECB 1998b). Monetary targeting per se was
rejected, however. Instead money￿s role as an indicator of future in￿ation was emphasized:
￿Deviations of current monetary growth from the reference value would, under normal
3circumstances, signal risks to price stability.￿ The reference value was reconsidered in
December 1999 and maintained at 4.5%. The second pillar is a ￿broadly-based assessment
of the outlook for price developments and the risks to price stability,￿ where the assessment
is made ￿using a wide range of economic and ￿nancial variables as indicators for future
price developments.￿
From the above discussion, it is clear that the ￿rst pillar is redundant. Only the second
pillar is needed, if interpreted as a conditional forecast, taking into account all relevant
information, including that in monetary aggregates. There seem to be no rational reason
for giving a certain set of indicators of future in￿ation the status of a separate ￿pillar￿
(rather than one of the bricks in one main pillar). This instead makes the framework
inconsistent and ambiguous, as several observers have noted. In contrast, when the Swiss
National Bank (1999) in December 1999 announced that it would abandon monetary
targeting, it simply made clear that ￿[m]onetary policy decisions will be based mainly on
an in￿ation forecast, which will take all relevant indicators into account.￿
III. Communication
In￿ation-targeting central banks make considerable e⁄ort to explaining past outcomes
and motivate current policy decisions, typically with reference to published conditional in-
￿ation forecasts. For instance, Sveriges Riksbank organizes its quarterly In￿ation Report
(see, e.g., Sveriges Riksbank, 1999) according to its view of the transmission mechanism
and the determination of in￿ation; it also systematically updates its estimates of the main
determinants of in￿ation and summarizes the resulting adjustments in its conditional in-
￿ation forecast relative to that reported in the previous In￿ation Report. The degree of
uncertainty in the forecast is also updated and assessed in each Report.
These practices of in￿ation-targeting central banks allow outside observers to scruti-
nize the central banks￿ analysis and forecasts and then judge whether the policy decisions
taken are appropriate, given the goals and available information. Several central banks
also publish minutes from the monetary policy meetings, which allows outsiders further
to assess whether the discussion and analysis are competent, whether the various argu-
ments presented are appropriate, and whether ￿nal decisions are consistent with the goals.
4Altogether, this commitment to communicate simpli￿es outside monitoring and evalua-
tion of monetary policy, strengthens the accountability of the central banks, and provides
stronger incentives for the banks to ful￿ll their announced goals. Compared to previous
monetary-policy regimes, the in￿ation targeting has introduced an unprecedentedly high
degree of transparency into monetary policy.
How does the Eurosystem compare? So far the Eurosystem has not published its most
crucial information, the internal forecasts. Indeed, initially keeping the forecasts secret
was considered a virtue (Duisenberg 1998a): ￿... publishing an in￿ation forecast would
obscure rather than clarify what the Governing Council is actually doing. ... [B]ecause
publishing a single in￿ation forecast would be likely to suggest that monetary policy re-
acts mechanistically to this forecast, publication might mislead the public and therefore
run counter to the principle of clarity.￿ However, since September 1999 several public
statements have indicated that forecasts will be published, and in December Duisenberg
(1999) stated: ￿We, of course also compare those [external] forecasts with our internal
preliminary forecasts, which will ultimately be published in the course of next year...￿.
The extended quarterly versions of the Monthly Bulletin of June, September and Decem-
ber 1999 have started to report external forecasts. Duisenberg (1999) actually seems to
reveal ECB￿s internal forecast: ￿...the European Commission also forecasts average in￿a-
tion in 2000 and 2001 to be 1.5%, and we see no reason to deviate from that forecast￿
(emphasis added). Duisenberg did not reveal whether this number should be interpreted
as an unconditional forecast (conditional on optimal policy by the Eurosystem) or a con-
ditional forecast (for instance, conditional on an unchanged interest rate). In the former
case, it seems that 1.5% for 2001 should probably be interpreted as the Eurosystem￿s
point in￿ation target (consistent with the in￿ation target used in the calculation of the
M3 reference value).
The Eurosystem does not publish minutes and voting records of the General Council
meetings. Instead, it has argued that the introductory statement at the press conference
held immediately after the meetings are similar to ￿summary minutes.￿ If that is the case,
a comparison of the statements with the minutes of Bank of England and Sveriges Riks-
bank gives the unfortunate impression that the Eurosystem is considerably less advanced,
5systematic, and forward-looking than those banks. The 2-week delay in publishing the
minutes from Bank of England is probably close to the minimal time necessary to summa-
rize and edit sophisticated and detailed discussions and arguments. In any case, a press
conference is certainly not a commitment to give an adequate report of the discussions at
a meeting and rather an invitation to a somewhat selective presentation.
The Eurosystem￿s reluctance to be more open and transparent, in particular in publish-
ing internal forecasts and minutes, has probably been quite costly from a public-relations
perspective. The Eurosystem￿s repeated pronouncements about its high degree of trans-
parency (for instance, Ignazio Angeloni and Otmar Issing, 1999) have not carried far,
since critics have the easy task of pointing to other central banks that are clearly more
transparent.
IV. Actual Instrument Decisions
The Eurosystem￿s main instrument is its ￿main re￿nancing rate,￿ a short repurchase
rate. On December 22, 1998, the Eurosystem announced that it would set an initial rate
of 3%. On April 8, 1999, the rate was lowered to 2.5%. On November 4, the rate was
increased to 3%. Were these decisions appropriate, given the goals of the Eurosystem and
the information available at the times of decision?
Did the Eurosystem take its controversial ￿rst pillar into account? Between October
1998 and October 1999, the 3-month moving average of 12-month M3 growth rates ￿uc-
tuated between 4.7% and 6.0%. At the time of the decision in April, the 3-month moving
average of the 12-month M3 growth through February was 5.1%, well above the reference
value of 4.5% (the money-growth rate is published with about 4 weeks lag). Presumably,
this should have motivated an increase rather than a decrease of the interest rate. During
March-September, the moving average rose steadily to 5.9%, motivating an increase, but
not necessarily as late as November. Obviously, the ￿rst pillar has been disregarded at
the Eurosystem￿s discretion￿hardly surprising, given its redundancy.
Instrument decisions should ideally be evaluated ex ante, given the information avail-
able to the Eurosystem at the time of the decisions. The crucial information would include
the Eurosystem￿s internal conditional in￿ation forecasts during the period, for instance,
6the conditional in￿ation forecasts for 3% and 2.5% interest rates in April and November,
respectively. Since the Eurosystem has declined to make this information available and
to allow outside scrutiny of its forecasts, it is not possible to decide with any precision
whether the decisions were appropriate. Using external forecasts is problematic, since the
assumptions of external forecasters about Eurosystem monetary policy need to be sorted
out. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that external forecasts, as reported in the December
1999 Monthly Bulletin (and apparently also internal forecasts, see above) point to average
in￿ation of 1.5% in 2000 and 2001.
Because of the transmission lags in monetary policy, it is too early for any ex post
evaluation of Eurosystem decisions. Another year or two will be needed for that. Since
actual outcomes are contaminated by shocks occurring after instrument decisions, or
unknown at the time of decisions, ex post evaluation is far from straightforward. Missing
the target range is not necessarily evidence of a mistake, and meeting it is not necessarily
evidence of good decisions.
V. Conclusions
The ￿rst year of the Eurosystem has seen a successful launch of the Euro and an
apparently successful introduction of the common monetary policy. The Eurosystem
monetary strategy is quite similar to ￿exible in￿ation targeting, for instance, in having a
quantitative de￿nition of price stability, in the emphasis on the medium term, and in the
concern to avoid real instability. Eventual publication of internal forecasts would increase
this similarity. There seem to be no fatal mistakes in either design or instrument setting.
Still, there is considerable room for improvement with regard to internal consistency and
transparency of the regime.
The remaining asymmetry and ambiguity in the de￿nition of price stability, although
minor, does not seem to serve any useful purpose. The insistence on the separate ￿rst
pillar is an important source of ambiguity and inconsistency. The ￿rst pillar is redun-
dant (as also indicated by the ￿rst year￿s experience), if the second pillar is interpreted
as a conditional in￿ation forecast incorporating all relevant information, including mon-
etary aggregates. A rational role for monetary aggregates is to contribute to conditional
7forecasts, among other indicators and according to their predictive power, as for the
in￿ation-targeting central banks (and now apparently also the Swiss National Bank).
There is considerable room for increased transparency about General Council meetings.
The introductory statements at the press conference after the meetings are hardly sub-
stitutes for the minutes published by the in￿ation-targeting central banks, certainly not
if the meetings become more sophisticated and are the genuine locus for decisions. It is
di¢cult to see that the Eurosystem could lose from further increases in consistency and
transparency.
It is worth emphasizing that since the ECB was created in 1998, it has made sin-
cere e⁄orts to maintain an open dialogue with academic researchers and external experts,
including critics, as witnessed by an active visitors program and participation in and
organization of a number of academic conferences. Visitors to the ECB have also experi-
enced open-minded, sophisticated and informative discussions with a very competent and
insightful sta⁄. Overall, I believe there are good reasons to be optimistic about the future
of Eurosystem monetary policy.
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